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WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
HERMAN L. TRAUTMAN*
The subject matter of this article will be presented in four parts
entitled Wills, Trusts, Future Interests and Fiduciary Administration.
The latter will include the developments of the year1 concerning both
the administration of decedents' estates and the administration of
trust estates because to an increasing extent the statutes and decisions
are relevant to both kinds of fiduciary administration. Legislative de-
velopments concerning probate law are also included under each
heading as well as the court decisional developments.
WLS
Dependent Relative Revocation: If the terms of a revocation are
expressly conditional, the will is revoked only if the condition is ful-
filled. It is thus possible that a revocation clause by its terms can be
made dependent upon the happening of a condition; and it might
perhaps be shown by oral evidence in a few cases of revocation by
physical act that the decedent's intention was to revoke only upon
the condition that a particular event has occurred. There are probably
only a very few cases, however, where such a frame of mind can
really be established.
More frequent are instances where a revocation was induced by
some mistake of law or fact on the part of the testator. These cases
of revocation based on mistake tend to be included with the infre-
quent cases of true conditional revocation and classified under a
doctrine known as "dependent relative revocation." The substance of
this doctrine is that the revocation was conditional or dependent
upon some other event or fact which did not happen. It would seem
more realistic to treat the mistake cases for what they really are in
fact and decide them in accordance with the probable intention of the
decedent.
In Briscoe v. Allison2 the decedent sat at the breakfast table and
tore his will into many parts. He had previously expressed dissatis-
faction with it. The proponent contended that there was no revocation
because of the decedent's intention to make another will, but the
finding of fact implicit in the jury verdict and in the review of the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Nashville and Ten-
nessee Bars.
1. The "year" covered in this article extends from June 1, 1956 through
May 31, 1957. The Tennessee court decisions included are reported in the
volumes of the Southwestern Reporter beginning with 289 S.W.2d 695 and
extending through 301 S.W.2d 379.
2. 290 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. 1956).
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evidence by the court of appeals is that there was no clear intention
to make a new will. The doctrine of "dependent relative revocation"
was therefore properly held to be not applicable to this case as there
was neither (1) a true conditional revocation, nor (2) evidence of a
revocation based upon mistake.
Construction Problem: A little knowledge can be a dangerous thing
indeed, and this is often demonstrated by the results in cases involving
holographic wills. In Boulton v. Cochran3 the testatrix wrote her will
in her own handwriting indicating that she knew something about the
procedure for the administration of a testamentary estate by provid-
ing that her executor should employ "no lawyer"; "Twill not be neces-
sary. I have utmost confidence in my executor." The report of the
case indicated that six lawyers were involved in its solution, however,
and because the provisions of the will itself gave rise to the litigation
the court of appeals refused to tax the costs to the persons who ques-
tioned it, taxing instead all costs to the decedent's estate. It does not
seem amiss to say that holographic wills do tend to be penny wise and
pound foolish.
In this case the testatrix gave many specific gifts such as a piano to
A, a big pin with earrings to match to B, a wicker chair and celery
dish to C, a flowered bowl to D, etc., for a long list. It is not clear
from the opinion whether the following clause is located after all the
specific gifts, or between them, but the following clause is in issue:
"Should any money come in after other things taken care of give it to
Oscar Cochran, also hay and corn if any on hand at my death."
Does this clause constitute a residuary gift of everything else to
Oscar Cochran? This was the construction problem before the court.
The heirs at law of testatrix were nephews and nieces. They con-
tended that testatrix died intestate with respect to certain govern-
ment bonds, an automobile, a cow and chickens (all together worth
several thousand dollars) which were not specifically bequeathed,
and that the word "money" in the above gift to Oscar Cochran meant
literally money and not bonds, automobile, cow or chickens. The
court held that the above clause was intended as a residuary gift,
however, and directed the executor, who really did need a lawyer's
help, to distribute accordingly.4
Probate and Contest: In Swindoll v. Jones5 one of the witnesses to
3. 292 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
4. Judge Avery's opinion extends over some nine pages in the Southwestern
Reporter. Much of this space considers the "rule" in other cases. The Su-
preme Court has frequently pointed out that comparing cases and distinguish-
ing them does not serve a very useful or important purpose with respect to
the solution of construction problems. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Board, 194 Tenn.
223, 231, 250 S.W.2d 82, 85 (1952). For a comment on the relevance of other
cases in construction problems in Tennessee see Trautman, Future Interests-
1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 V.mi. L. REv. 1096, 1105 (1953).
5. 292 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
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the will stayed at home and thereby failed to testify at the trial in
circuit court of a will contest, although he had testified when the will
was admitted to probate in common form. His wife, another witness
to the will, testified at the will contest trial that he was sick and "not
able to be here." Also, it appears that he had once been adjudicated
insane and committed to a mental hospital and that there was no legal
restoration. The contestor moved the circuit court for a directed
verdict against the will on the ground that sections 32-204 and 32-406 of
the Tennessee Code require a will to be proved "by all living witnesses,
if to be found" when the will is contested. The circuit court overruled
the motion and the jury verdict was in favor of the validity of the
will. The court of appeals reversed holding that the proof did not
adequately show the physical inability of the witness to the will to
testify. The court emphasized that this question of the unavailability
of the witness should be determined by the trial judge upon detailed
evidence, and that the trial judge should not accept the mere conclu-
sion of a witness. In pointing out that it is mandatory in will contests
for all attesting witnesses to a will to be produced by proponents if
they are available, the court held that a will should not be admitted
and read to the jury as a part of the evidence until the trial court
has properly determined that all living witnesses available have been
produced in court. The prior adjudication that this witness was in-
sane was held not sufficient to excuse his presence without a finding
by the trial judge expressly on that point. It would seem that this
decision requires an express finding by the trial judge in the record
concerning the unavailability of witnesses to the will.
In Jones v. Sands6 there was a will contest and the circuit court
directed a verdict in favor of the will. The Court of Appeals, Western
Section, reversed, holding that the trial court should have let the
case go to the jury.
The 1957 Legislature7 amended section 30-610 of the Tennessee Code
to provide a period of grace of one year during which beneficiaries of
an unprobated will and creditors of the decedent's estate will be pro-
tected against a bona fide purchaser from the heir. After the period
of one year from the death of the owner a bona fide purchaser and
mortgagee from an heir of decedent will be protected against all
persons claiming under an unprobated will of such decedent; also,
if no personal representative has qualified during the one year period,
a bona fide purchaser and mortgagee shall take title free from the
right of a creditor to subject the property to his debt.8 This statute
6. 292 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
7. TENN. PuB. ACTS 1957, c. 118.
8. See Trautman, Real Property-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (1956), pointing out the need for such legislation.
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should remove what has been a substantial hazard9 in approving a
title based upon a conveyance of real property by the heir of a de-
ceased record owner. Heretofore it was always possible that a will
might be belatedly probated giving the property to others. The statute
does not invalidate the unprobated will after the time limit; it only
protects a bona fide purchaser after the time limit. The problem of
the unprobated will was presented to the Supreme Court in First
Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Dearth.'0 The decision in that case
would be the same under this statute because the heir's conveyance
was made some three months after the death of the record owner.
In Wright v. Eakin," however, the heir's conveyance was eleven years
after the date of death of the record owner.
TRUSTS
There were only two court decisions12 in which some aspect of the
substantive law of trusts was involved. There are several new statutes,
however, which were passed by the 1957 Legislature concerning the
administration of trusts. The statutes will be discussed in the section
on fiduciary administration.
Constructive Trusts: Terrell v. Terrell' 3 involved a bill in chancery
filed by an infant, Johnny, against Aunt Lucy. The bill alleged, and
the court of appeals and Supreme Court found as facts, contrary to
the findings of the chancellor, that Father and Mother had executed
a deed conveying a house and lot to Father's sister, Aunt Lucy, who
immediately executed her deed to infant son Johnny. It was alleged
that the latter deed was delivered to Father who put it in a desk
drawer and did not record it. It seems that Father was motivated in
this transaction by his alimony problems with his first wife. The
alimony problems were apparently settled, possibly on the basis of
false testimony by Father that he had sold this property for $10,000
to Aunt Lucy, but the alleged deed from Aunt Lucy to Johnny could
not be found after Father's death. The first wife is not in this case,
so that there is no claim by a creditor of a fraudulent conveyance.
While there was evidence that Aunt Lucy acknowledged that the
property "belongs to Johnny," she refused to execute a new deed. The
defense sustained by the chancellor was based on the Statute of
Frauds, the unclean hands of Father, judicial estoppel based upon
9. See First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dearth, 198 Tenn. 304, 279
S.W.2d 503 (1955) where the Supreme Court held that there is no statute of
limitations in Tennessee limiting the time in which a will may be probated,
and held for the devisees against the mortgagee.
10. 198 Tenn. 304, 279 S.W.2d 503 (1955).
11. 151 Tenn. 681, 270 S.W. 992 (1925).
12. Terrell v. Terrell, 292 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1956); Range v. Tennessee
Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n, 298 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
13. 292 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1956).
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Father's testimony in the alimony matter, and insufficient evidence to
establish a lost deed. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court
reversed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to prove that Aunt
Lucy executed a deed to Johnny; (2) the doctrines of judicial es-
toppel and unclean hands were not applicable to Johnny because he
was not a party to the divorce proceeding nor was he claiming as
heir of Father, but as grantee from Aunt Lucy; (3) the Statute of
Frauds was not applicable to Johnny.
If the theory of the decision is that the court was establishing a
lost deed, the law of trusts is not necessarily involved. Assume, how-
ever, for the purpose of discussion, that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish a lost deed; the same result could be reached upon either
of two trust theories, one of which seems clear, the other arguable.
They are (1) that there was an oral express trust for Johnny, and (2)
that a constructive trust should be imposed upon Aunt Lucy. Both
theories seem applicable only because Tennessee is one of approxi-
mately fourteen states which have not reenacted the seventh section
of the English Statute of Frauds which required all declarations of
trust and confidences of land to be in writing.14 The result is that
a trust of real estate may be created orally in Tennessee when the oral
agreement of the grantee to hold it in trust is contemporaneous with
the execution and delivery of a deed absolute on its face.'5 This
theory seems clear.
The constructive trust theory is somewhat debatable. If A conveys
land to B upon an oral trust for C or upon an oral contract to convey
to C, it is clear that in most states the seventh section of the Statute
of Frauds prevents the enforcement of the express trust or contract.
The questions considered then are (1) should B be allowed to retain
the land? (2) Should a constructive trust be raised in favor of C?
(3) Should a constructive trust be raised in favor of A? While it
seems clear that B would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to keep
the land, the argument in favor of that result is that to do otherwise is
to violate the policy of the Statute of Frauds. The majority of the
courts have been unwilling to frustrate this legislative policy and
accordingly have allowed B to keep it, although there is respectable
authority to the contrary.16 Since the equivalent of the seventh sec-
tion of the English Statute of Frauds is not a part of the public policy
of Tennessee, our courts are not confronted with the problem of
frustrating the legislature; it would accordingly seem that Tennessee
courts should have no hesitancy in imposing a constructive trust upon
14. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1935); BOGERT, TRUSTs 62 n.
57 (3d ed. 1952).
15. Brantley v. Brantley, 198 Tenn. 670, 281 S.W.2d 668 (1955); Insurance
Co. of Tennessee v. Waller, 116 Tenn. 1, 95 S.W. 811, 813 (1906).
16. 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 45 (2d ed. 1956) and cases there cited.
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B in order to prevent an unjust enrichment. While the court in the
instant case apparently puts the decision on the theory of establishing
a lost deed, a relevant quotation from the near end of the opinion
states that "a court should not enrich a fraudulent grantee at the ex-
pense of parties not responsible for the original grantor's attempt to
avoid creditors."'
17
Trust or Debt: The distinction between a trust and a debt is indeed
an important one giving rise to fundamentally different results. There
are many transactions, however, in which it is not made clear whether
the relationship is one or the other. A trust involves a duty to deal as
a fiduciary with property for the benefit of another who is regarded
as the equitable owner of it. A debt involves a mere personal obliga-
tion, the creditor having no ownership in the debtor's specific property
until after it is subjected to judicial proceedings. Any capital growth
with respect to such property results in an increase in the net worth
of the trust beneficiary but not to the creditor. Also, it is fundamental
that a trustee is limited in the uses to which the trust property can
be put.
The suit in Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n 18
was an attempt by eleven members of a cooperative association, a
Tennessee corporation, to bring a class action in behalf of themselves
and the other 70,000 or more producers to prevent the corporation
from using certain profits for the construction of several new storage
warehouses. The Association seems to have agreed that each pro-
ducer was entitled upon his demand to a share of the profits, but the
right of plaintiffs to bring a class action was denied. The court held
that the "situation is not unlike that involving depositors in a bank."'19
If a trust had been established, the corporation could not use the
profits for its own expansion.
FUTURE INTERESTS
Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rule Against Perpetuities is a
rule of public policy developed by the courts in Anglo-American
government, aimed against contingent future interests which may
vest at a time too remote in the future. The existence of any kind of
future interest, vested or contingent, tends to restrict the alienability
of property because the title is divided. But if the future interest is
contingent, the handicap is greater and perhaps impossible. Prior to
the recognition of the executory interest, the usual contingent future
interest was a contingent remainder. Because of the common law rule,
still in effect in Tennessee,20 that a contingent remainder is destroyed
17. 292 S.W.2d at 184.
18. 298 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
19. Id. at 550.
20. Cochran v. Frierson, 195 Tenn. 174, 258 S.W.2d 748 (1953); Robinson v.
12431957 ]
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which fails to become a vested remainder prior to the termination of
the prior life estate, the contingent remainder was never considered
a serious clog upon the marketability of title. When the executory
interest was recognized after the Statute of Uses and was held not
subject to the destructibility rule,2' the specter loomed large that
the titles to all the land in England would become tied up with con-
tingent interests so as to become unmarketable. The Rule Against
Perpetuities was accordingly formulated by Lord Chancellor Notting-
ham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case22 as a rule of public policy intended
to prevent contingent future interests which are not sure to vest,
or which fail to vest, within a prescribed period of time. That period
of time was originally lives in being, thus parallel to the destructibility
of contingent remainder rule. It was later extended to lives in being
plus twenty-one years in order to allow for the minority of the ulti-
mate takers. Subject to several variations, the rule generally is as
stated by Gray: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest. ' 23 Note particularly that the rule is concerned only
with contingent future interests; the term "vest" therefore refers
to vesting in interest and not to the time when the future interest will
become a present possessory interest. Because it is a rule of public
policy intended to strike down those gifts by testators and grantors
which violate its time limit, the application of the rule generally
does not depend upon the intention of the testator or grantor. Like-
wise, because there is a maximum time limit in which contingent
future interests must either vest or fail, expressed in terms of a
formula "lives in being plus twenty-one years" there is a mathematical
computation implicit in the rule, and court decisions applying it tend
to be wrong or right, depending upon the accuracy of the court's
computation in each case.
In Sands v. Fly24 the testatrix devised two tracts of land creating
contingent future interests which were attacked by the sole heir at
law as violative of the rule. The decision of the Supreme Court seems
partly right and partly wrong. Tract one was devised to Son for life,
remainder to his children living at his death for life, and upon the
Blankenship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S.W. 854 (1906); for a discussion of this
principle see Trautman, Future Interests and Estates-1954 Tennessee Survey,
7 VAND. L. REV. 843 (1954).
21. Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620).
22. 3 Chan. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
23. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942).
24. 292 S.W.2d 706 (1956). The case is discussed in a student note in 45
KY. L. J. 704-10 (1957). While this note seems to present an accurate analysis
of the validity of the contingent future interests under the Rule, the conclusion
that the case indicates the need for reform in the law of future interests is
a non sequitur. Also, it is not true that "Everybody . . . thought this an un-
just devise and cast about for ways of invalidating it, but apparently no
one came up with any doctrine compelling the desired result." Id. at 706.
[ VOL. 101244
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death of the last surviving child of Son, remainder in fee to A, B, C,
D, E, F, and G,.
with the child or children of any one or more of them who may not
be living at the time of the termination of the life estates hereinbefore
created to take, per stirpes, the same share or shares in said tract of
land that it or their parent or parents would have taken if living at that
time. If any one or more of said [named devisees above] ... should not
be living at the time of the vesting of said remainder, and should not be
survived by a child or children, then his or her share in the remainder
shall pass to the other living nieces or nephews, or to their children as
above provided.25
Since the rule applies only to vesting in interest and not to vesting
in possession, if the remainder to A, B, C, D, E, F, and G is regarded
as vested subject to being divested by the death of any of the named
devisees before the death of the last surviving child of Son, the
remainder would be good under the rule because it became vested in
interest immediately at the death of testatrix. Also, if the remainder
to these persons is considered contingent, it would still be good as to
them, because they are lives in being and their interests will either
become vested, or fail to vest, during their lives. It is thus possible to
have valid future interests, indeed contingent future interests, which
will become vested in interest within the period of the rule, even
though they will not take effect in possession until after the period of
the Rule. Under such a construction, however, it is perfectly clear
that the two contingent future interests created by the gift over
violates the rule because neither must necessarily vest or fail to vest
within lives in being plus twenty-one years. Son and his children
alive at the death of testatrix and A, B, etc., the named remainder-
men and their children alive at death of testatrix may be considered
as the lives in being at the creation of the interests. Son could have
additional children born after the death of testatrix, and then every-
one alive at death of testatrix could die with the newly born children
surviving for more than twenty-one years thereafter; thus the gift
over would not necessarily vest or fail to vest within the mathematics
of the rule. Also, the law is clear that the rule operates to make void
any future interest which violates it. The mere fact that it is highly
improbable that a condition precedent will take effect beyond the
period does not make valid the future interest which is subject to it.
To be valid, it must be certain from the face of the instrument creat-
ing the future interest that it will vest or fail within the time limit.
Survivorship of the last child that Son may have seems to be the
essential condition precedent of any recognizable economic interest
in the property on the part of the alternate takers and this is the very
25. 292 S.W.2d at 708.
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kind of dead hand projection which the policy of the rule seeks to
prevent. While there is a rule of construction which favors construing
a future interest as vested rather than contingent when there is doubt,
it is a mere rule of construing intent when in doubt, and there seems
to be very little doubt here that testatrix wanted to control the
devolution of this land upon the happening of a contingency which
would not necessarily take place within the Rule.
Tract two was devised to Son for life, remainder to his children
living at the time of his death for life, and upon the death of the
last surviving child of Son one-half was devised in fee simple to the
Baptist Orphanage, and the other one-half to P "provided she should
be then living, and if not then her share in said tract shall go in fee
to" X, Y, and Z. It is clear that the future interest to the Baptist Or-
phanage is perfectly valid because it is a remainder fully vested in
interest; not subject to any contingencies other than the normal ex-
piration of the prior life estates. It seems equally clear that the
future interests given to P, X, Y, and Z are subject to the contingency
of survivorship to the death of the last survivor of any children that
Son may have. Because the required survivorship is a condition
precedent to vesting which need not necessarily take place within the
time limit of the rule, this remainder seems contingent and void. If it
is argued that the remainder to P is vested subject to being divested,
then clearly the gift over to X, Y, and Z is void. But realistically, the
interests of P, X, Y, and Z are alternative contingent remainders de-
pendent upon survivorship to an event which need not take place
within the rule.
The Supreme Court upheld as valid all of the future interests cre-
ated by the will of the testatrix. Because Son was forty-four years
old and had four children living at the death of testatrix, the court
seems to assume that Son would have no additional children, so that
the remainder to children for life would be limited to lives in being
at death of testatrix, and thus the remainders in fee would vest at
the end of lives in being. This reasoning was not articulated by the
court, but it seems to be fairly implicit in the opinion. The difficulty
is that the remainder to the children is a class gift of a future interest;
the rule of construction normally applied in class gifts of future inter-
ests is that membership in the class is usually held open until the
future interest becomes a present possessory interest.26 Thus it
would not seem to be the intention of the testatrix to exclude children
of Son born after her death. The cases cited by the Supreme Court
do not seem relevant to the problem involved. Armstrong v. Doug-
lass2 7 involved a construction of present section 64-104 of the Tennessee
26. SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 292-99 (1951).
27. 89 Tenn. 219, 14 S.W. 604 (1890).
1246 [ VOL. 10
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
Code which changes the common law construction of the phrase "die
without issue" or its equivalent from an indefinite failure of issue-
i.e. when the lineal line ended-to a definite failure of issue construc-
tion-i.e. upon the death of the named person. That litigious phrase
is not involved here. Eager v. McCoy 28 held a power of sale in trust
to be void because of the rule. The remainder interests to grandchil-
dren were upheld because the court first construed the gift to vest in
those grandchildren living at the death of the last of the sons of the
testatrix. 9 Satterfield v. Mayes30 is the old Tennessee class doctrine,
criticised and ignored by subsequent Tennessee cases 31 and practically
abolished by section 32-305 of the Tennessee Code. Brown v. Brown32
is one of the leading American cases repudiating the spurious English
case of Whitby v. Mitchell;33 the case holds that a gift to the unborn
child of an unborn child is not necessarily void.
Construction Problems: The construction problem discussed above
in the section on wills concerned the interpretation of a present inter-
est. The discussion here will be concerned with construction problems
involving future interests.
In Lowe v. Rice34 the testator devised land in trust for the benefit
of his widow (W) for life, and at her death remainder "to all my
Grandchildren, six now in number, i.e., [A, B, C, D, E and F] and
any other Grandchildren hereafter born to my three children."
Testator was survived by three children, parents of the named grand-
children and his widow. A seventh grandchild was born after tes-
tator's death and before W's death. The problem was whether
grandchildren who may be born after W's death would have an inter-
est in the land. The Court of Appeals, Western Section, affirmed the
decision below holding that the testator's intention to include after-
born grandchildren was clearly expressed and would be upheld. This
has the effect, however, of making the title unmarketable for the
lives of the testator's three children, a result likely not considered by
the testator. While the gift was to named individuals, it was also to
"any other Grandchildren hereafter born to my three children." It
is difficult to say that it was not in part a class gift, and the court
dealt with the problem on that basis, notwithstanding it said that the
class doctrine is not applicable. It is certainly true that at best the
28. 143 Tenn. 693, 228 S.W. 709 (1921).
29. Id. at 708.
30. 30 Tenn. 58 (1849).
31. Ward v. Saunders, 35 Tenn. 387 (1855); Bridgewater v. Gordon, 34
Tenn. 5 (1854). See 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 122 (1936) and Tennessee
cases there cited; McSween, The Tennessee Class Doctrine. A Spectre At The
Bar, 22 TENN. L. REV. 943 (1953).
32. 86 Tenn. 277, 6 S.W. 869 (1887), rehearing, 7 S.W. 640 (1888).
33. [1890] 44 Ch. 85 (C.A.).
34. 291 S.W.2d 287 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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various rules about class gifts are mere rules of construction to be
used by the courts as an aid to construing the gift when the intention
is not clear. The present decision seems to follow a literal interpreta-
tion of the gift. Ordinarily, however, a class gift closes to maximum
membership at the time of distribution if of personalty, at the time
possession is taken if of realty. This rule was developed as a rule of
convenience in fiduciary administration, and is applied generally as
a rule to both cases of personalty and realty.35 Under this rule of
construction the class of "other Grandchildren hereafter born" would
close at the death of the life tenant when the future interest became
a present possessory interest so that the then owners could make a
marketable title. Under the construction adopted by the court the
class will not close until the death of all the testator's children, and
the title will remain unmarketable because of the possibility of addi-
tional grandchildren being born, but the Rule Against Perpetuities is
not violated because the class will close at the end of lives in being.
Ross v. Bateman6 involved a devise in trust for the benefit of a
nephew, W. D. Bateman, for life, and upon his death the trust to
terminate and remainder to "the lawful children of said W. D. Bate-
man surviving him." Could this remainder go to an adopted child?
Complainant was the adopted and only child surviving W. D. Bate-
man. She contended that adopted children are lawful children, and
that she was literally included in the gift. But the Supreme Court said
that "children" was not intended to include adopted children. While
this decision seems to be one of first impression in Tennessee, the deci-
sion is consistent with the usual rule of construction in other states,
particularly where the gift is not to the testator's own children or
grandchildren and where, as here, the adoption had not taken place
before the death of the testator.3 7 The draftsman of a will should be
alert about adopted children.
Butler v. Parker38 involved a deed to "Ralph Parker and at his
death to his bodily heirs." The Supreme Court properly held that
section 64-103 of the Tennessee Code abolishing the rule in Shelley's
Case thereby creates a contingent remainder. The court assumed,
however, that the "children" received the contingent remainder.
This does not necessarily follow. The word "children" usually means
immediate offspring, and does not include grandchildren or more
remote issue.39 The phrase "bodily heirs" would seem to include
more remote issue.
35. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 288-299 (1951).
36. 291 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1956).
37. 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 223 (1936).
38. 293 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1956).
39. 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 218 (1936).
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FiDucIARY ADMINISTRATION
There were eight court decisions and eight items of legislation en-
acted by the 1957 General Assembly concerning the fiduciary admin-
istration of decedents' estates, trust estates, guardianships, and cus-
todians. The court decisions will be discussed first, then the legisla-
tion.
Court Decisions
Claims: An apparent conflict between sections 30-516 and 30-517 of
the Tennessee Code was clarified by the Supreme Court in Needham
v. Moore.40 Within nine months from the date of the publication of
the first notice to creditors, all persons having claims against the
estate of the decedent must file their claims in duplicate with the clerk
of the court in which the estate is being administered. 41 Unless the
claim is filed within this period it is "forever barred," and no court
has the power to extend this period of time.4 2 Section 30-517 of the
Code provides that exceptions to claims may be filed at any time
up to thirty days after the expiration of the nine months period.
Section 30-516 of the Tennessee Code provides first that the clerk
shall give the fiduciary written notice of a claim within five days after
it is filed; it then provides that if a claim is filed during the ninth
month, the fiduciary shall have thirty days after receipt of the notice
from the clerk. The problem is whether the fiduciary and other inter-
ested parties have less than thirty days after the nine months for filing
exceptions to a claim filed during the ninth month. The Supreme
Court held that the fiduciary and other interested parties always have
the thirty days after the nine month period to file exceptions as pro-
vided in section 30-517, and that section 30-516 can only increase this
period provided in section 30-517, never decrease it. Suppose a claim
should be filed on the last day of the nine month period. The clerk
has five days to notify the fiduciary. In this event the fiduciary and
other interested parties have thirty days from receipt of the clerk's
notice to file exceptions under section 30-516, and this would be a
few days longer than the period provided in section 30-517. The court
provides an illuminating discussion of how to compute the months
and the days provided in the statutes. The exceptions filed by a
grandson were fied on the very last day possible in the instant case
because the preceding day was a Sunday.
State Department of Public Welfare v. O'Brien43 holds, however,
that the state's claim for moneys paid under the Old Age Assistance
40. 292 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1956).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-510 (1956).
42. Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, 178 Tenn. 179, 188, 156 S.W.2d 425, 429
(1940); 2 PInCHARD, WrLLs 264 (3d ed. 1955).
43. 292 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1956).
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Law is not "forever barred" by the failure to file it within the nine
month period. This is consistent with a general common law rule
that the sovereign's claim is not within the statute of limitation un-
less expressly so provided."
Brigham v. Southern Trust Co.45 raises a question whether an execu-
tor or administrator can ever be surcharged on a final accounting for
failure to file exceptions to a claim within the ten month period pro-
vided in section 30-517 of the Tennessee Code. Failure to except to
claims filed against the estate within the time prescribed becomes in
effect a judgment against the estate, so the claimant will be paid.
Can the distributee or next of kin surcharge the fiduciary by object-
ing to his claim for credit for paying a claim which should have been
opposed? It is true that section 30-517 provides that in addition to
the personal representative any party interested in the estate either
as creditor, distributee, heir or otherwise may file an exception within
the time prescribed; and it is true that the claimant cannot be denied
if no exceptions are filed. But it certainly does not follow from this
that a fiduciary cannot be surcharged on his accounting if he violated
a fiduciary duty of loyalty and prudence in fiduciary administration.
Also, bear in mind that section 30-516 requires a notice of the claim
to be sent only to the fiduciary, not to beneficiaries. An executor or
administrator is charged with the duty of exercising due care in the
allowance of claims, and he is charged with the fiduciary duty to con-
test claims to which there is a valid defense or, indeed, a substantial
question.46 It would seem that the very least required of a fiduciary
under such circumstances would be a notice to the beneficiaries so
that they could oppose the claim. As was said by the New York Court
of Appeals:
The duty of executors clearly does not permit them merely by allow-
ing or paying claims against the estate without regard to their character
to shift the burden of proof upon objectors. They are still bound to the
exercise of proper care. They must act on satisfactory proofs that the
claim is justly due.47
The Southern Trust Company case was decided by the Tennessee
Supreme Court upon appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County where the county judge apparently also sits as circuit judge
in such matters. It may be that the case depends upon a procedural
point since it arose in a petition to hold the administrator liable to
a distributee for failure to file an exception to a claim. The case was
44. Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, 178 Tenn. 179, 156 S.W.2d 425 (1940).
45. 300 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn. 1957).
46. Gorham v. Gorham, 54 Ind. App. 408, 103 N.E. 16 (1913); In re Tay-
lor's Estate, 251 N.Y. 257, 167 N.E. 434 (1929); ATKINSON, WILLS 703 (2d ed.
1953).
47. In re Taylor's Estate 251 N.Y. 257; 167 N.E. 434, 436 (1929).
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heard by the circuit court on the record from the county court with-
out any proof, and the beneficiary's petition was dismissed. The rec-
ord apparently showed only the claim and the fact that exceptions
were not filed to it. The lower court's dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The reasoning of the court was that because the
petitioner was eligible to file an exception under section 30-517 of
the Tennessee Code, his failure to have done so prevents him from
surcharging the administrator for not opposing the claim. It does
not appear, however, whether the petitioner as a next of kin had a
notice that the claim was filed. Since section 30-516 of the Code
requires the clerk to give written notice of the filing of a claim only
to the personal representative, it is possible that a beneficiary of an
estate would not know about a claim within the time limit. The
court's statement that the only basis upon which the administrator
could be liable would be proof of malfeasance or misfeasance in office,
or collusion seems too broad and inexact. It is generally recognized
to be the plain duty of a fiduciary to protect the estate, and to this
end to interpose every legal defense available, and to dispute a claim
when he has good reason to doubt its validity.48 Furthermore, it is
the general rule in Anglo-American law of fiduciary administration
that the question of whether the fiduciary acted with due care and
prudence in the payment of a claim is properly raised by objections to
the fiduciary's claim for credit on his final account.49 If there is a
reasonable doubt about the validity of a claim a fiduciary is under a
duty to file exceptions to it, and his failure to do so is generally
grounds for surcharge. The Court in the instant case does not seem
to give adequate recognition to this basic fiduciary responsibility.
Survivorship Bank Deposits: In Peoples Bank v. Baxter0 there was
a certificate of deposit made by decedent payable to the order of
herself "or payable on death to" X. The next of kin contended that
this item should be included in the inventory of assets in the decedent's
estate. There was a division of opinion among the judges of the Court
of Appeals, Western Section, the majority opinion affirming the
chancellor who held for X "subject to the just debts of" the decedent.
If the certificate is subject to the debts of the decedent, it would seem
that it should be inventoried as an asset of the estate. Actually, the
majority opinion seems to uphold the right of the survivor on the
theory of a third-party beneficiary contract. The dissenting would
deny the survivor named in the certificate of deposit upon the plain
48. 2 WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMMISTRATION 1023 (3d ed. 1923);
ATKINSON, WILLs 703-04 (2d ed. 1953).
49. Rutledge v. Trautman, 49 N.E.2d 551 (Ind. App. 1943), superseded, 221
Ind. 623, 51 N.E.2d 4 (1943); 3 WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINIS-
TRATION 1796-1803 (3d ed. 1923) and cases there cited; ATKINSON, supra note 46.
50. 298 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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policy of the Wills Act,51 and this makes much sense. Quite regardless
of what other states may hold on the so-called "poor man's will,"
to uphold a bank certificate like that in the instant case is a bit of
judicial legislation which flies in the face of the legislative policy ex-
pressed in the Wills Act. When one adds up all the exceptions to this
policy created by the courts, it is found that there is frequently
nothing left in the probate estate.
Petition To Sell Realty: On a petition to sell realty to make assets
for the payment of debts, the chancery court has jurisdiction to order
a sale even though the decedent's interest was fractional and the
other concurrent owner was a nonresident incompetent; so held the
Court of Appeals, Eastern Section in Goins v. Yowell.5 2 The non-
resident was served by publication, and upon affidavit of incom-
petence a guardian ad litem was appointed to defend her rights.
Apportionment of Estate Taxes: Section 30-1117 of the Tennessee
Code requires the amount of the federal estate tax paid by the fidu-
ciary to be equitably prorated among those persons who receive the
estate "except in a case where a testator otherwise directs in his
will." In Commerce Union Bank v. Albert53 the testator's will con-
tained a tax clause directing the executor to pay from his residuary
estate all taxes for which his estate or any beneficiary might be liable,
including taxes on "property not passing by my will." The widow dis-
sented from the will, however, and the fiduciaries then contended
that because she took by intestate succession, she must pay her pro-
portionate part of the taxes. The Supreme Court held that the widow
did not have to pay a part of the taxes because the testator's will
directed otherwise. The court said that notwithstanding the widow's
dissent, the testator's will continued as an effective document for
the proration of taxes. This is an interesting case of first impression
in Tennessee.5 Should tax clauses in estate planning be made
conditional upon no dissent by the widow?
Miscellaneous: Lakins v. Isley5 5 held that a mother who had custody
of the infant child of her deceased daughter had no standing in court
to remove the divorced husband of the decedent from the office of
administrator, because the mother would not inherit anything. The
court said that there was no charge that the divorced husband was
not a proper and suitable person to serve as administrator, and that
the surplus assets would pass to the infant. While the mother of a
deceased daughter who was divorced would seem to be among the
51. TEN. CODE ANN. § 32-104 (1956).
52. 293 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
53. 301 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1957).
54. Accord Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1956). Contra,
Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957).
55. 292 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1956).
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next of kin eligible under section 30-109 of the Tennessee Code, the
court in effect holds that only those next of kin who will inherit
can question the qualifications of the fiduciary.
Chapman v. Tipton6 held that the minor children of a deceased
father who was divorced are not entitled to a year's support out of
proceeds of the sale of decedent's property. While the husband's
homestead exemption was not assigned to the mother in the divorce
proceeding, the decision seems to be based on policy grounds-the
common law obligation of a father to support his minor children
terminates with death; hence, his estate cannot be charged with the
support of his minor children after the date of death.
1957 Legislation
Decedents' Estates: While section 30-501 of the Tennessee Code con-
tinues to require that the inventory be verified before the clerk, the
statute was amended 57 to allow the inventory to be verified before any
person authorized to administer oaths when it appears to the judge
of the county court that the fiduciary is unable to appear before the
clerk.
Section 30-602 was amended by substituting a new first sentence
which provides the procedure to be followed when all of the land of
a decedent lies outside the county of administration. 58
While section 30-1001 prohibits any action by a creditor of the es-
tate other than filing claims and reviving pending actions for a period
of six months from the issuance of letters, the section was amended
to provide that the state may enforce its tax lien during this period.59
Fiduciaries Generally: Section 30-119 of the Tennessee Code, found
in the pocket supplement, was enacted by the 1955 Legislature. It
prohibited a non-resident from being appointed to act as personal
representative in Tennessee unless a resident was appointed to serve
with him. The 1957 Legislature amended this section, and renum-
bered it as section 35-610, so that it now prohibits the appointment of
all types of non-resident fiduciaries, e.g. as trustee, executor, admin-
istrator, guardian, "or in any other fiduciary capacity" unless a
resident fiduciary is appointed as a co-fiduciary.60 This would appar-
ently prevent the appointment of a fiduciary from another state serv-
ing as ancillary administrator in Tennessee unless a resident fiduciary
was appointed. This legislation was apparently sponsored by the
banking interests in Tennessee. An exception was provided allowing
56. 292 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1956).
57. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 34.
58. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 395.
59. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 242.
60. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 52.
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a foreign bank or trust company to serve as sole fiduciary when the
state in which the foreign bank or trust company is organized or has
its place of business grants authority to Tennessee banks to serve as
sole fiduciary in the foreign state. Does this legislation discriminate
unlawfully against human beings and in favor of corporate banks? Is
it constitutional? It would seem possible that non-resident banks
could be lacking in financial responsibility as well as professional com-
petence to about the same extent as individuals, since corporations
realistically are only aggregates of human beings. Very probably a
county judge could nevertheless refuse to appoint such banks.
Section 35-325, which allows trustees to hold stocks and registered
bonds in the name of a nominee without mention of the trust provided
certain safeguards are observed, was amended by the 1957 Legislature
so as to become applicable to all fiduciaries and fiduciary relationships;
it is no longer limited to trustees and trust estates.
61
Section 34-411, which authorized a guardian to sell securities for
reinvestment if he obtained the approval of the court was repealed.
62
This repeal, sponsored by the state banking interests, seems to serve a
useful purpose. Sections 35-319 to 35-325 constitute the statutory
prudent man rule on investments in Tennessee. The prudent man
statute is applicable to all fiduciaries, trustees, guardians and other
fiduciaries, and within the limitations of the standard therein stated,
a guardian as a fiduciary may buy and sell securities for purposes of
reinvestment without a court order. Because section 34-411 continued
in the Code, however, cautious transfer agents tended to require a
court order when guardians sought to sell notwithstanding section
35-320. It will no longer be a problem.
Section 34-107 was amended to provide that when a guardian shall
have only a fund not exceeding five hundred dollars, the appointing
court may dispose of it by order for the best interests of the ward.
6 3
The Uniform Gifts To Minors Act was enacted by the 1957 Legis-
lature.64 It constitutes sections 35-801 to 35-810 in the pocket supple-
ment of the Code. This new legislation was sponsored by the Tennes-
see components of the New York Stock Exchange and the Investment
Bankers Association. This legislation, enacted in several other states,
has generally been opposed by the trust-banking industry. The pur-
pose is to facilitate the gift of securities to minors by creating the con-
cept of a statutory custodian who may receive, buy and sell property
for a minor. The act provides the exact form of the gift necessary
in order to gain the protection provided the "custodian." It is pro-
61. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 49.
62. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 48.
63. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 102.
64. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 112.
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vided that the gift conveys the "vested legal title" to the security or
money to the minor, but no guardian has any right, power or author-
ity over it. The custodian, however, has very broad powers parallel
to a discretionary accumulation trust with power to invade. Income
and principal may be applied for the minor's support. Probably the
major reason for the phenomenal spread of this legislation has been
its apparent simplicity of concept and operation. By giving broad
managerial powers to a simple custodianship, lifetime giving to minors
has been made possible without necessary resort to formal guardian-
ship or a trust.
That the "custodian" is a fiduciary, however, there would seem to
be no doubt. The broad powers carry correlative responsibilities
which parallel trusts so closely that there seems no doubt of their
fiduciary character. Likewise there are certain federal tax conse-
quences which might come as some surprise.
For gift tax purposes, it is a completed gift, and it qualifies for the
$3,000 annual gift tax exclusion. 65 If the donor transfers the security
to himself as custodian for the minor, and if the income from the
security is thereafter used to support the minor whom the donor is
under a duty to support, the donor is taxed on the income from the
security to the extent so used.66 Where the donor transfers the
securities to himself as custodian and thereafter dies before the minor
reaches twenty-one, the securities are included in the donor's gross
estate.
67
The three rulings, taken together, are a reminder that a lifetime
gift may be complete for gift tax purposes, not complete for the
estate tax, and a hybrid for the income tax. Also, the Treasury's
attitude in treating the custody arrangement as analogous to a trust
is indicative of a likely future development; it is very likely that the
Treasury will require custodians to file Form 1041 fiduciary income
tax returns.
Perhaps a discussion of the legal issues tends to exaggerate the
dollar-cents importance of the problem, however. The income tax
ruling would not seem serious. The estate tax ruling can be avoided by
having the donor designate someone other than himself as custodian.
While trusts will continue to be used as the tool for gifts to minors by
people of wealth, the stock exchange legislation may provide a con-
venient alternative tool for some.
65. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 449.
66. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 23.
67. Rev. Rul. 57-336, 1957 INT. REV. BULL. No. 32, at 20.
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